LABOR LAW -WORK

STOPPAGES CALLED TO PROTEST ACTIONS
OF A FOREIGN STATE ARE LABOR DISPUTES SUBJECT TO THE
PROHIBITION AGAINST SECONDARY BOYCOTTS OF SECTION 8(b)(4) OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President
Carter imposed an embargo upon exports to the U.S.S.R.' Subsequently, International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) President
Thomas W. Gleason ordered the immediate suspension of handling
of Soviet ships and cargoes by ILA workers from Maine to Texas
and Puerto Rico.2 ILA members in various ports complied with
that directive.' Allied International, a United States importer of
Soviet wood products, had contracted with a United States shipper for transport of products from the Soviet Union. The shipper
employed a stevedoring company to unload the cargo. Members
of ILA Local 799 in Boston, acting on Gleason's orders, refused
to unload Allied's cargo.4
The controls were implemented by regulations issued by the Department of Commerce
on January 7, 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 1883 (1980) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. parts 376,
386 and 399). The controls were issued pursuant to a presidential directive, under authority
granted by the Export Administration Act of 1979. 50 U.S.C. app. S 2401 (Supp. IV 1980).
For further discussion, see Walczak, Legal Aspects of the U.S.S.R. GrainEmbargo, 10 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 279 (1981).
' Walsh v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 524, 526 n. 1 (D. Mass. 1980). The
statement was as follows:
In response to overwhelming demand by the rank and file members of the union,
the leadership of ILA today ordered immediate suspension in handling all Russian
ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to Texas and Puerto Rico where
ILA workers are employed.
This order is effective across the board on all vessels and all cargoes. Grain
and other foods as well as high valued general freight. However, any Russian
ship now in process of loading or discharging at a water front will be worked
until completion.
The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international events
that have affected relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
However, the decision by the union was made necessary by the demands of
the workers. It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes
under present conditions in the world.
People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy as
long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a decision in
which the union leadership concurs.
See, e.g., Baldovin v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980); Mack
v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980); Walsh v. Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass. 1980). When the Court was confronted with the Allied
appeal, it also considered an action affirming the role of arbitration in such disputes. New
Orleans S.S. Ass'n. v. Gen. Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted
sub nor., Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. ILA Local No. 1408, 622 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981).
' Eventually, the union agreed to unload a shipment, but only in Boston. This forced
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Allied responded to the ILA boycott by filing an unfair labor
practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board.' The
Board found that the union activity constituted a secondary boycott,
in violation of sections 8(b)(4)(i) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor
Relations Act (Act)." The Board and the Acting Regional Director
petitioned the federal district court for a preliminary injunction
against the local.' The court held that the union action did not constitute a secondary boycott. The petition was denied on the grounds
that it was an expression of political protest; thus, in effect, it was
construed as a primary boycott against the Soviet Union with incidental effects on the employers.8 Consequently, Allied sued for
damages The district court granted an ILA motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. 10
On appeal to the First Circuit, the decision was reversed and
the importer to offload the entire shipment, portions of which were destined for other
ports. Allied's shipments were disrupted, which forced the company to renegotiate its
contracts.
A common element in the collective bargaining agreements in Allied and the aforementioned cases are "no-strike" and "arbitration" clauses such as the following:
1. In pertinent part, the language is as follows:
"(a) No Strikes-No Lockouts
There shall be no strikes, work stoppages, nor shall there be any lockouts.
(b) Disputes Procedure and Arbitration
The parties accept the principle that any dispute involving the interpretation or application of the terms of this agreement shall be resolved in an
orderly and expeditious manner. They commit themselves to the procedure
outlined below . . . and failure to deal with disputes under the disputes procedure shall constitute a violation of this agreement.
(c) These steps shall be followed to insure prompt resolution of disputes. The
arbitrator's authority shall be limited to interpretation and application of the
terms of this agreement .... The arbitrator shall have no authority to render
decisions which have the effect of adding to, subtracting from, or otherwise
modifying the terms of this Agreement."
New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Gen. Longshore Workers 626 F.2d 455, 459 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1980).
' Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n., 257 N.L.R.B. 151 (1981).
' Id.; 29 U.S.C. SS 158 (b)(4)(i), (b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976).
' Walsh v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass. 1980). The injunction
was sought pursuant to S 10(i) of the Act.
' Walsh v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 524, 531. The Acting Regional Director
appealed. See Walsh v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 630 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1980) (vacated
and remanded).
' Allied Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1980). The
complaint paralleled the N.L.R.B. charge of violation of sections 8(b)(4)(i), 8(b)(4)(ii)(B),
for which Allied had a private right of action under S 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. S 187 (1976). Additionally, Allied alleged that the boycott violated
S 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1 (as amended, 1975), and subjected the union
to maritime tort liability. A divided court of appeals rejected the antitrust and tort claims.
Allied Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1980) (Aldrich, J.,
concurring and dissenting.)
"0In so doing, the court relied on its holding in Walsh v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n,
488 F. Supp. 524, supra note 7.
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remanded." The court held that elements of a violation of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) were established, and that the ILA actions were "in
commerce" within the meaning of the Act, even though inspired
by the military actions of a foreign power.'2
Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court:
held, affirmed. "Political" secondary boycotts are not excluded from
the scope of section 8(b)(4)(B) where the effects reasonably can be
expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss.
InternationalLongshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO v. Allied InU.S. __
(1982).
ternational, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1656, __
The issuance of restraining orders or injunctions "in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute" is restricted." Title
29, United States Code section 113(c) defines labor dispute in the
following manner:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee. 5
Attempts to invoke federal jurisdiction typically are predicated
upon section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act. 6
The nature of the underlying dispute becomes significant when
attempts are made to characterize it as a "labor dispute." Thus,
the inquiry shifts to a determination of the parties involved. The
ILA actions against the Soviet Union were not unprecedented. During the Cuban missile crisis, the ILA boycotted all ships involved
in trade with Cuba. 7 Similarly, the union previously had refused
" Allied Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368 (lst Cir. 1980).
12

Id.

, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
102 S. Ct. 90 (Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-1663).
" 29 U.S.C. SS 104-115. (emphasis added).
" Section 13(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. S 113(c) (1932). In situations where the nature of
the dispute does not lend itself to an immediate characterization as a "labor dispute," litigation results, particularly when there is an underlying element of political expression involved.
" 29 U.S.C. S 185(a) (1947). Section 101 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. S 151 (1947), encourages
the disposition of labor-management disputes through arbitration. Hence, the characterization of a "dispute" is frequently tied to its arbitrability. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976) (where the issue involved is the meaning of a no-strike
clause, which itself is subject to arbitration, it is improper for courts to rule prior to arbitrator's decision); Boys Mkts, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (a strike is
enjoinable if the grievance in question is subject to arbitration).
" See, Penello v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 227 F. Supp. 164 (D. Md. 1964) (a politically
motivated action is a "labor dispute" subject to N.L.R.B. jurisdiction).
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to load grain bound for the Soviet Union until the president of
the ILA was satisfied that the interests of the United States public
were safeguarded. 8 However, in that instance the Fifth Circuit
held that such a "political dispute" was not a "labor dispute."' 9
At about the same time, ironically, a separate panel of the Fifth
Circuit found that a strike protesting the importation of South
African coal was a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Act.'
Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits union
actions such as strikes, refusals to handle materials, or threats
or coercion, with the object of forcing one party to cease or restraining one party from conducting business with any other party.2'
The Supreme Court developed a two-tier test to identify violations
of section 8(b)(4) in Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
v. N.L.R.B.22 "Employees must be induced; they must be induced
to engage in a strike or concerted refusal; an object must be to
force or require their employer or another person to cease doing
business with another person."2 3 The purpose of section 8(b)(4) is
to "shield ...unoffending employers and others from controversies
not their own" while at the same time protecting the right of labor
organizations to bring pressure on offending employers in primary
disputes.' Section 8(b)(4)(i) confines the prohibition against second-

"BW. Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 372, 376 (S.D.
Tex. 1975), affd summarily, 531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976).
19 Id.
0 United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), reh'g
denied, 526 F.2d 377 (1976), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1978). See also Khedivial Line, SAE
v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960); But cf., N.L.R.B. v. Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n (Ocean Shipping), 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964) (politically motivated boycott is not
a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Act).
' 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4) reads as follows:
(b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials,
or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where
in either case an object thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ....
Id.
',Local 1796, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. N.L.R.B., 357 U.S. 93 (1958).

Id. at 98.
u Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612 (1966). Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of
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ary boycotts to situations involving employers or industries
"engaged in commerce."' This jurisdictional threshold becomes relevant in a labor activity involving some form of foreign rather than
domestic action.
In Benz v. CompaniaNaviera Hidalgo, the Court held that the
protections of the Act did not extend to picketing by United States
unions in support of a strike by foreign seamen against their foreign
employers.26 Such activity has been found to be "not in commerce"
within the meaning of the Act. 7 The essence of the Benz holding
and subsequent cases on point is that United States labor laws
are not intended "to resolve labor disputes between nationals of
other countries operating ships under foreign laws. 2' Accordingly,
the Court has held that picketing of foreign ships to protest wages
paid to non-union United States workers falls within the meaning
of "in commerce" as defined by section 2(6) of the Act.29
This trend was reaffirmed by the Court in Windward Shipping
(London) Ltd. v. American Radio Association.0 In Windward Shipping, the Court again held that picketing of foreign ships to protest
wages paid to foreign crews was not activity "affecting commerce"
within the meaning of the Act." The Court reached the same conclusion in American Radio Association v. Mobile Steamship
Association.2 Although Mobile Steamship arose from the same incident as Windward, it can be distinguished by the fact that a
United States company sought the injunction. The Court refused
to bifurcate its analysis simply because the same activity generated
both foreign and domestic repercussions. Thus, the Court recogthe Act protects unions when engaged in primary activity regardless of the impact upon
neutral employers. The distinction between "secondary boycotts" and the protected "primary
boycotts" has been the subject of considerable litigation, with conflicting results. See generally
Electro-Coal Transfer Corp. v. Gen. Longshore Workers, 591 F.2d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 1979).
(A "primary" boycott exists where the activities are addressed to the labor relations of
the contracting employer. A "secondary" boycott is calculated to satisfy union objectives
elsewhere.) See also Hoffman & Sons, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 617 F.2d 1234 (7th
Cir. 1980). Cf. Local 1976 United Bhd. of Carpenters v. N.L.R.B., 357 U.S. 93, 98 (1958)
(section 8(b)(4) is not a sweeping prohibition).
5 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4), supra note 21. "Commerce" is defined in 29 U.S.C. S 152(6) (1976).
"Affecting Commerce" is defined in 29 U.S.C. S 152(7) (1976).
,' Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
' Incres S.S. Co. v. Int'l Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963); McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
" Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. at 143.
Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariande Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 200 (1970).
See supra note 25.
' Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. Am. Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
"' Id. The Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the avowed purpose of
the activity was to publicize the competitive advantage enjoyed by the foreign shippers
as a result of their wage scales.
, Am. Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
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nized that the response of the United States employers was a "crucial part of the mechanism" by which the union's foreign objective
33
was to be satisfied.
The foregoing reveals the two-step analysis developed in approaching 8(b)(4) situations. The first step characterizes the underlying dispute to determine if it is "in commerce," by examining both
the object of the union activity and the response of the foreign
entity. The second step examines whether the domestic effects of
the activity can be severed to identify an independent domestic
dispute that is subject to regulation under the Act.Y
Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court, asserted that section 8(b)(4) is "aimed precisely at the sort of activity alleged in
this case. 35 The opinion began the "in commerce" phase of the
two-step analysis by addressing the ILA contentions that the activity was not in commerce and, alternatively, that it was not the
sort of secondary boycott Congress intended to proscribe. 6
Justice Powell reviewed the Benz-Windward-Mobile line of cases
to identify the jurisdictional limits of United States labor law. He
reaffirmed that this line of cases does not permit a bifurcated view
of the effects of the union activity. 7 Powell recognized that Allied
was distinguishable from the Benz line of cases in that "Itihis drama
was 'played out by an all-American cast.'" The Court held that

31 Id. at 220-24. Curiously, it was the union that was arguing in favor of a finding that
a secondary boycott existed. In so doing, it desired the removal of the case from the jurisdiction of the state courts to the presumably more sympathetic jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B.
Note the strong dissents by Justice Stewart, Douglas, Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 234-44.
3 See,. e.g., Baldwin v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980). Baldwin
arose from the same boycott as in Allied. Although the court determined that there was
a "secondary boycott" within the accepted sense of the term, the court found that the
fact that the boycott was directed against the Soviet Union removed it from the constraints
of the Act, despite an incidental effect upon United States commerce. Thus, the court applied Windward and Mobile to deny the injunction. Cf.Walsh v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n,
488 F. Supp. 524, 528 (D. Mass. 1980). vacated and remanded (on different grounds), 630
F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1980) (dismissal on grounds of res judicata). The Walsh court held that
the same activity clearly affected commerce due to the effect it has on the consignee (Allied).
This dichotomy belies the fact that the Supreme Court has noted that directing a boycott
toward a foreign entity need not automatically preclude N.L.R.B. jurisdiction. Am. Radio
Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 225 n. 10 (1974). However, the Mobile rejection
of a bifurcated approach was substantiated by the First Circuit in Allied. See also Grain
Elevator Workers v. N.L.R.B., 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967);
Madden v. Grain Elevator Workers, 334 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
967 (1965).
Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., No. 80-1663, 102 S. Ct. 1656, U.S.
(1982).
30

Id.

31Id. See supra note 34.
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the Benz principles were applicable and conclusive of a finding
that the language of the Act and its elements were satisfied.'
In applying the second step of the analytical framework, Powell
reasserted that the prohibition against secondary boycotts in section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was clearly applicable in this case. 9 Although the
objectives of the boycott were characterized as "understandable
and even commendable," the fact that the "certain effect of its
action is to impose a heavy burden on neutral employers" was
dispositive in construing the secondary boycott provisions. 0 Thus,
the Court applied the Carpentersv. N.L.R.B. test." The Court maintained that the congressional objectives in enacting the secondary
boycott provisions included protection of employers from disputes
that are not their own. 42 The disruption of Allied's business was
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the boycott. This
foreseeability overcame the ILA defense that the object of the
boycott was to free ILA members from handling objectionable
goods."3 Similarly, the opinion rejects the contention that "political
boycotts" are exempt from the section 8(b)(4) prohibitions.44
Finally, Justice Powell noted entrenched precedent to reject the
ILA contention that application of section 8(b)(4) infringes upon
their first amendment rights.45 The characterization of this conduct as coercive and not communicative is consistent with traditional first amendment analysis.
Allied Internationalreaffirms that section 8(b)(4) was intended
to protect neutral employers from the repercussions of a labor
dispute directed at a primary employer target. Furthermore, the
rejection of a bifurcated treatment of the domestic, as distinct from
the foreign, effects of labor actions does more than merely reaffirm the Benz-Windward-Mobile line of cases. Indeed, it appears to
add a third step to the section 8(b)(4) analysis: the degree of intru-

, 102 S. Ct. at 1662,
39

Id.

__

U.S.

-

(1982).

,o Id. at 1663.
" See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 24.
102 S. Ct. at 1663, U.S. _
(1982).
" Id. at 1664. The Court expressed concern that such an exception not only would be
counter to congressional intent, but would open avenues to circumvent S 8(b)(4) under the
guise of political expression.
," Id. See N.L.R.B. v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980). It
is well established that the first amendment extends to union activities. However, such
activities are subject to regulation or restraint. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945);
Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
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sion into matters of foreign policy. Although distinguishable from
its predecessors in that Allied did not involve an attempt by the
ILA to extend its influence over workers employed by foreign entities, the signal to foreign trading partners is clear. Despite political
differences United States labor may have with foreign traders,
any labor action taken without the support of the executive branch
effectively may be precluded.
Edward Paul Gibbons

